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Suicide Under Workmen's Compensation Laws
Thomas J. Scanlon*
S UICIDE IS THE ACT of taking one's own life voluntarily and
intentionally. Refining the definition to a greater degree,
judicial decisions have held that suicide is usually an act of a
person who is able to weigh and appreciate the results of the
contemplated deed.' As an act of this nature is against public
policy, the state will do everything possible to discourage and
prevent it.
Actually, no jurisdiction allows a death claim for suicide
according to the strict definition of the term. When death
benefits are paid to a decedent's dependents for death produced
by his own hand, the term "self-destruction" rather than suicide
is applicable. To allow recovery, all jurisdictions require that
the decedent be subject to some mental derangement at the time
of the commission of the act. It is the degree of derangement
required, the manifestation of it, and the causal relationship of it
to the compensable injury which create problems.
Briefly stated, the prevailing views on this subject can be
divided into three general categories. First, the decedent must
have suffered a compensable injury producing the insanity.
This mental disorder must have caused the decedent to take his
own life through an uncontrollable impulse, or in a delirium of
frenzy without a conscious volition to produce death.2 Second,
the deceased must have been suffering from a mental disorder
and this condition must be due to a work-connected injury.8
Third, the mental disorder can be caused by any work-connected
activity and no traumatic injury is required. 4
*B.S.S., John Carroll University; Senior, Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 Hepner v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, 141 Wash. 55, 250 P. 461 (1926).
2 In re Sponatski, 220 Mass. 526, 108 N. E. 466 (1915). This case is the
basis for the majority rule.
s Harper v. Industrial Com., 24 Ill. 2d 103, 180 N. E. 2d 480 (1962). White-
head v. Keene Roofing Co., 43 S. 2d 464 (Fla. 1949); Burnight v. Industrial
Accident Comm., 181 Cal. App. 2d 816, 5 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1960). The English
point of view is comprehensively annotated in 143 A. L. R. 1232 (1943).
This view represents the minority rule in the United States.
4 Wilder v. Russell Library Co., 107 Conn. 56, 139 A. 644 (1927); Burnight
v. Industrial Comm., supra n. 3. This is the most extreme point of view,
and the two cases cited are the only ones holding that an injury is not
required. These cases allowed death claims for suicides caused by insanity.
The cause of the insanity which ultimately produced suicide was overwork.
(Continued on next page)
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Majority View
In 1915 the Massachusetts Supreme Court5 enunciated the
majority rule. In this case the decedent, while in the course of
his employment, had hot molten lead splashed into his eyes.
While hospitalized and in a state of agonizing pain, he threw
himself from a window and was fatally injured. The court up-
held the decision of the Industrial Commission, allowing the
claim. Judge Rugg set forth the majority rule which is followed
in most of the jurisdictions:
Where there follows as the direct result of a physical injury
an insanity of such violence as to cause the victim to take
his own life through an uncontrollable impulse or in a
delirium of frenzy, "without conscious volition to produce
death, having knowledge of the physical consequences of
the act," then there is a direct and unbroken causal con-
nection between the physical injury and the death. But
where the resulting insanity is such as to cause suicide
through a voluntary willful choice determined by a moder-
ately intelligent mental power, which knows the purpose
and physical effect of the suicide act even though the choice
is dominated and ruled by a disordered mind, then there is
a new and independent agency which breaks the chain of
causation arising from the injury.6
This workmen's compensation decision was decided under
the same test which is applied in regular tort cases. Daniel v.
New York, N. H., and H. R. Co.7 applied the same rule in a
wrongful death action to determine whether or not a surviving
dependent could recover from a tortfeaser whose wrongful act
ultimately caused the injured person to commit suicide.
Following this general rule, courts first decide whether a
compensable injury caused the insanity, and also the extent of
the insanity. Therefore, if a decedent, while suffering from a
(Continued from preceding page)
The editors in 56 A. L. R. 459 comment that the Wilder case is the only
decision of its kind in the United States. The Burnight case, decided in
1960, is the only decision which has used the Connecticut case as a
precedent.
5 In re Sponatski, supra n. 2, p. 468. This is the majority rule and is
restated constantly in numerous cases and treatises on the problem. See
also, 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation, Sec. 36.20, p. 505, (1952); 5
Schneider, Workmen's Compensation, Sec. 1411, p. 526, (1946).
6 In re Sponatski, supra n. 2 at p. 468.
7 183 Mass. 393, 67 N. E. 424 (1903).
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mental disorder due to an industrial accident commits suicide,
the party claiming the death benefits has the burden of establish-
ing that no intervening cause produced the death. This is illus-
trated in a Massachusetts case s which refused to award death
benefits for a suicide committed by a person suffering from a
mental disorder. The decedent's act of self-destruction was will-
ful and voluntary; therefore, death was not caused by a compens-
able injury.
Under the majority rule it appears that a claimant trying
to obtain the death benefits must establish that the self-destruc-
tion of the decedent was due to a non-volitional act. He also has
the burden of establishing that this non-volitional condition of
the mind was manifested by the decedent's action prior to death.
The most common method used to show the mental condition
of the decedent is to introduce evidence showing that he was
acting under an uncontrollable impulse or in a delirium of frenzy.
Actually the requirement that the act be committed either
while under an uncontrollable impulse or while in a state of de-
lirium of frenzy, is relaxed considerably when the courts apply
this rule. Tribunals are endeavoring to determine the con-
dition of the decedent's mind at the time of death. With this in
mind, courts hold that when a person is suffering from extremely
painful injuries sustained in an industrial accident his act of self-
destruction is either due to an uncontrollable impulse or is com-
mitted while in a delirium of frenzy.9 Thus, the nature of the
injury and the outward manifestations of the pain are examined
in order to determine the condition of the mind at the time of
death. The converse can be easily seen in that courts following
the majority rule deny compensation when the insanity is caused
by remorse, depression, melancholy, and discouragement. 10
8 Tetrault's Case, 278 Mass. 447, 180 N. E. 231 (1932).
9 Blasczak v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 193 Pa. Super. 422, 165 A. 2d 128
(1960); McFarland v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 188 Wash. 357, 62 P. 2d
714 (1936), reh. den. (1937); Schofield v. White, 250 Iowa 571, 95 N. W. 2d
40 (1959). A quote from the McFarland case is an excellent illustration of
this view: "If the injury causes pain and suffering which proximately
causes insanity or a mental condition which renders the workman subject
to periods of delirium, and the workman during a period of such delirium
takes his own life, death may be attributed to the injury and is com-
pensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act."
10 Tetrault's case, supra n. 8. It must be noted that this case made no
mention of Sinclair's Case, 248 Mass. 414, 143 N. E. 330, (1924), which
allowed recovery where the self-destruction was caused by starvation.
The motivation for the starvation, according to the court, was due to
(Continued on next page)
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The most stringent applications of this majority rule are
found in jurisdictions where an integral provision of the Work-
men's Compensation Act precludes recovery for any intentional
self-inflicted injury." Although suicide is not specifically men-
tioned, a broader, more general term, "any self-inflicted injury,"
is considered as including suicide. 12 Forty-three states have
statutes of this nature; 13 however, the application varies de-
pending on the facts in the cases decided by the courts.
The Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation
Act 4 has a provision regarding self-injury similar to that found
in the various state statutes. The Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Texas15 allowed recovery for suicide. When the act
(Continued from preceding page)
insanity caused by depression and a psychastenic state of mind. The mental
condition of the decedent was proximately caused by a compensable
injury; and therefore, a death claim was allowed. This case is clearly
a departure from the previous decision in Massachusetts; however, the Tet-
rault case realigned this state as following the majority rule. Now, neither
case is applicable in this jurisdiction the legislature enacted a statute
governing this problem. Under the statute for decedent to recover death
benefits, he must show that an industrial injury caused the insanity and
this insanity rendered the decedent irresponsible for his self-destruction.
Mass. Gen. Ann. Ch. 152 sec. 26A, (1937). In view of this statutory enact-
ment, Massachusetts has relaxed the requirements enunciated in In re
Sponatski, supra n. 2.
The following are additional cases which refuse to honor death claims
due to depression: Palmer v. Redman, 281 App. Div. 723, 117 N. Y. S. 2d
708, (1952); Seal v. Effron Fuel Oil Co., 284 App. Div. 795, 135 N. Y. 2d
231, (1954); Veloz v. Fidelity Union Casualty Co., 8 S. W. 2d 205 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1928); Widdis v. Collingdale Millwork Co., 169 Pa. Super. 612,
84 A. 2d 259 (1951).
As can be seen in the cases cited, even New York, which certainly does
not follow the majority view, does not allow claims when the insanity is
of this nature. Seal v. Effron, supra, held that mere discouragement and
melancholy due to an accident are inadequate to allow a death claim for
suicide.
11 A typical example of a statute of this nature is found in the first para-
graph of the Ohio Rev. Code, sec. 4123.54 (1953).
12 99 C. J. S., Workmen's Compensation, sec. 264, p. 911 (1958).
13 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation, supra n. 5, at p. 504. The only
.states not having a provision of this nature are Connecticut, Illinois, Michi-
gan, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Wyoming. The author in this
treatise on the subject states that forty-one states have statutes of this
nature; however, both Alaska and Hawaii have similar statutes. 1 Schneider,
Workmen's Compensation Statutes, p. 74, sec. 2167, and p. 714, sec. 7482
(1939).
14 Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, 33 U. S. C. A.
901, 903(B), (1957).
15 Voris v. Texas Employer Inc. Ass'n., 190 F. 2d 929, (C. C. Tex, 1951),
cert. den., 342 U. S. 932, 72 S. Ct. 376, 96 L. ed. 694, (1952). See 8
NACCA L. J. 46, (1951). The author considers this case as supporting the
minority view; however, the court refused to decide specifically which view
was applicable.
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of suicide was committed it was the result of an irrational state
of mind and while the decedent was under an uncontrollable
impulse. The court referred to the majority and minority points
of view, and stated that the evidence in the case at bar could
support either view. Therefore, they refused to consider which
view was properly applicable under the federal statute. The
evidence showed that the act of the decedent was clearly non-
volitional, and this was the basis for the court's decision.
States having statutes precluding compensation for self-
inflicting injuries have applied various versions and adaptations
of the majority rule in deciding whether or not a death claim
should be honored. 16
In denying a death claim, the Missouri Supreme Court' 7 held
that self-destruction is never prompted by a completely normal
mind; however, if it is done with sufficient mental power to know
the consequences of the act, then compensation cannot be
awarded. This is true even though the mind is dominated by a
mental disorder caused by a compensable injury.
The Washington Supreme Court,' in allowing a death claim,
held that the act was committed under an irresistible compul-
sion or under an uncontrollable impulse. It is questionable in
this case whether or not the insanity was caused by the industrial
injury. Expert medical and psychiatric personnel testified that
there was a causal relation between the industrial accident and
the suicide; in fact, the accident precipitated the insanity which
ultimately caused the self-destruction. The question of proxi-
mate cause was specially submitted to the jury, which found
a causal relation. There was adequate evidence which demon-
strated the non-volitional nature of the decedent's act. The
method used in accomplishing the self-destruction was a mani-
festation of the decedent's inability to comprehend the physical
consequences of his deed.' 9
The Supreme Courts of Wisconsin and Minnesota have ap-
plied the majority rule in suicide cases under their workmen's
16 California is an exception. In Burnight v. Industrial Accident Com.,
(supra, n. 3), it was held that the self-inflicted injuries referred to in their
statutes apply only to injuries inflicted in order to obtain compensation.
17 Mershon v. Missouri Public Service Corp., 359 Mo. 257, 221 S. W. 2d
165 (1949).
18 Karlen v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, 41 Wash. 2d 301, 249 P. 2d 364
(1953).
19 In the case referred to in supra n. 18 the decedent destroyed himself
by thrusting his head into a running power saw.
jan., 1963
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compensation acts. In Anderson v. Armour and Co. 20 the Min-
nesota Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Industrial
Commission. In affirming this decision the court held that the
compensable injury caused the insanity and the decedent de-
stroyed himself while possessed of an uncontrollable or irresisti-
ble impulse, or while in a delirium of frenzy without rational
knowledge of the physical consequences of his act. The Wis-
consin Supreme Court in Jung v. Industrial Com.21 upheld the
decision of the Industrial Commission and denied a death claim
for suicide. They applied the same rule and held that when self-
destruction is not produced while in a delirium of frenzy, with-
out conscious volition, then the work-connected injury causing
the mental derangement is not the proximate cause of the suicide.
It appears that in applying this test to determine whether
or not a suicide is compensable, reviewing courts are reluctant to
tamper with findings made by the various commissions, boards,
and lower trial courts. If the evidence found in the record indi-
cates that the decedent's act was non-volitional, the reviewing
courts will not alter the award made by the inferior tribunals.
This supporting evidence can be either extreme pain closely
related to the injury or expert psychiatric testimony. If the
latter, it must positively state that the decedent was incapable
of a volitional act; and without evidence of this nature, recovery
will not be allowed. 22
Ohio applies the majority rule in deciding whether or not
suicide is compensable. In 1935, Judge Stephenson, in Industrial
Com. of Ohio v. Brubaker,23 laid down the following require-
ments for allowing death claims due to suicide: (1) The injury
causing the mental disorder must arise while in the course of
20 Anderson v. Armour & Co., 257 Minn. 281, 101 N. W. 2d 435 (1960).
This is indeed a most unusual case in light of the factual situation. The
court quoted verbatim the majority rule; however, in this case the decedent
did not sustain any physical injuries. He was involved in an automobile
accident in which he seriously injured another person. The emotional
experience precipated the onset of a psychotic depressive reaction which
ultimately caused the non-volitional suicide. Expert testimony established
the causal relationship and the reviewing court refused to evaluate it.
The court held that the evidence was adequate to allow the commission
to award the death benefits. Thus, we have a case which applies the
majority rule where the decedent suffered no traumatic injury.
21 Jung v. Industrial Com., 242 Wis. 179, 7 N. W. 2d 416 (1943).
22 Barber v. Industrial Com., 241 Wis. 462, 6 N. W. 2d 199 (1942); Anderson
v. Armour & Co., supra, n. 20; Jung v. Industrial Com., supra, n. 21;
Vennen v. New Dells Lumber Co., 161 Wis. 370, 154 N. W. 640 (1915).
23 Industrial Com. of Ohio v. Brubaker, 129 Ohio St. 617, 196 N. E. 409
(1935).
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employment. (2) The mental derangement produced by the
compensable injury must be to such an extent that it is im-
possible for the decedent to entertain a fixed purpose to take
his own life. (3) The self-destruction must be the direct result
of the lack of purpose which is characterized by an insane
mind.
24
In essence, under Ohio law, to allow recovery for suicide,
the claimant must show that the free moral agency of the actor
was not in existence at the time of death. However, the appli-
cation of the rule is relaxed to some extent in that the reviewing
courts are reluctant to alter decisions of inferior tribunals. As
long as there is some basis for the initial determination, the
reviewing court will uphold its findings and refuse to reconsider
the evidence. 25 An excellent example of this policy is stated in
Speece v. Industrial Commission:2
6
As suggested by the trial judge this, "is an extreme border-
line case," and it is possible that if the duty had been im-
posed upon me in the first instance of determining the
issue presented in this case by the evidence that I might
have reached a conclusion opposite to that at which two
juries arrived, both of which returned verdicts favorable
to the plaintiff . . .2T
In this case the decedent suffered over-exposure while in the
course of his employment. According to one expert witness, this
precipitated insanity. Thus, when the person killed himself he
was incapable of realizing the nature and physical consequences
of his act.
Generally, jurisdictions following the majority rule require
that evidence be introduced to show that the self-destruction was
due to a non-volitional act. The mental condition of non-volition
must be manifested by delirium or frenzy. If these exterior
manifestations are not apparent, then expert testimony which
tends to establish the non-volitional condition of the decedent's
mind is acceptable. This is not the only requirement that the
24 Id. at 617.
25 Industrial Com. of Ohio v. Adam, Gdn., 40 Ohio App. 362, 178 N. E. 319
(1931); Industrial Com. v. Boyal, 29 Ohio Ct. App. 1 (1918) (this is the
first case in Ohio which used the In re Sponatski Case, supra n. 2, as a
precedent); Industrial Com. of Ohio v. Brubaker, supra n. 23; Speece v.
Industrial Com., 46 Ohio L. Abs. 453, 70 N. E. 2d 387, (Ohio App. 1945).
Burnett v. Industrial Com., 87 Ohio App. 441, 93 N. E. 2d 41 (1949).
26 Speece v. Industrial Com., supra n. 25.
27 Id. at 462.
Jan., 1963
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1963
SUICIDE COMPENSATION
claimant must satisfy; he must also prove that the mental dis-
order which produced insanity was originally caused by a com-
pensable injury.
Minority View
The minority position is divided into two schools of thought.
First there are a few states which have totally rejected the ma-
jority view and have adopted the English position. Secondly,
through liberalization and modernization, some jurisdictions,
while not specifically rejecting the majority rule, have established
a position which is incompatible with it.
New York State is most illustrative of the second category.
In the 1930's New York was applying the test established in the
majority view to determine whether death benefits would be
awarded for suicide. 28 This test has never been abolished; how-
ever, the actual basis for recovery is found in the case of Deli-
nousha v. National Biscuit Co.29 The decedent there suffered
a compensable injury which produced a psychosis; this mental
derangement caused the deceased to commit suicide. The New
York Supreme Court upheld the award of the death benefits
made by the Industrial Board, and the Court of Appeals affirmed
this decision. Upon review the Court of Appeals considered the
strict majority view as being too harsh. Therefore, it was held
that a suicide is compensable if the act of self-destruction is
produced by a mental derangement proximately caused by a
compensable injury. The term "mental derangement" was
qualified in this opinion when the court held that suicide death
claims are not compensable if the mental disorders are classi-
fied as discouragement, melancholy, or a similar condition. It
would appear that the court considered the words "mental de-
rangement" and "insanity" as terms which could be applied inter-
changeably.
Since this decision, the New York courts have encountered
some difficulty in determining the degree of insanity or mental
derangement required to allow a death claim due to self-destruc-
tion.30 The conflict is clearly illustrated in the cases of Estate of
28 Stapleton v. Keenan Gifferd & Lunn Apartment House Co., 265 N. Y.
528, 193 N. E. 305 (1934); Konieczny v. Kresse Co., Inc., 234 App. Div. 517,
256 N. Y. S. 275 (1932).
29 Delinousha v. National Biscuit Co., 248 N. Y. 93, 161 N. E. 431 (1928).
30 The following cases denied death benefits, holding that discouragement,
melancholy, or personality changes due to a compensable injury constitute
(Continued on next page)
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Vernum v. New York University College31 and Maricle v.
Glazier.32 In the former the death claim was denied and in the
latter the benefits were awarded.
The decedent in the Vernum Case3 3 suffered a compensable
myocardial infarction which incapacitated him to such an extent
that he was neither able to continue his employment nor to en-
gage in his favorite outdoor activities. During his convalescence
he committed suicide. At the Industrial Board's hearing the
family physician testified that the deceased, due to the com-
pensable injury, was depressed, discouraged, and despondent
at the time of the fatal act. The board denied the claim and the
court upheld this denial. Hence the mental derangement was
inadequate to allow an award.
In Maricle v. Glazier"4 the deceased suffered a compensable
inguinal hernia, and corrective surgery was performed success-
fully. The deceased was discharged from the hospital, and while
recuperating at home he committed suicide. The Industrial Com-
mission allowed the death claim, holding that a compensable
injury produced a depressive psychosis which ultimately caused
the suicide. The physician testified that the decedent was suffer-
ing from a mental derangement. When questioned as to the
degree and extent of the derangement the doctor stated that it
affected the sanity of the person at the time of his suicidal act.
In making the award the commission did not consider the various
degrees of insanity. The Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court affirmed the award, and the Court of Appeals upheld this
decision without opinion.
(Continued from preceding page)
an insufficient degree of mental derangement to authorize the award of
benefits under the statute: Aponte v. Garcia, 279 App. Div. 269, 109 N. Y. S.
2d 761 (1952); Estate of Vernum v. State University of New York College
of Forestry, 4 App. Div. 2d 722, 163 N. Y. S. 2d 727 (1957); Palmer v.
Redman, supra n. 10, 117 N. Y. S. 2d, 708 (1952); Seal v. Effron Fuel Oil
Co., supra n. 10.
The following cases approved awards for suicides induced by depressive
psychosis, melancholy, and personality changes: Com. of Taxation & Finance
v. Hedstrom-Spaulding Inc., 272 App. Div. 857, 70 N. Y. S. 2d 362 (1947);
Lockwood v. Luckey Platt & Co., 267 App. Div. 930, 46 N. Y. S. 2d 937
(1944); Maricle v. Glazier et al., 283 App. Div. 402, 128 N. Y. S. 2d 148,
affd. 307 N. Y. 738, 121 N. E. 2d 549 (1954). For discussion of the Maricle
Case see: 26 Miss. L. J. 187 (1954 & 1955) and 14 NACCA L. J. 67 (1954);
Pushkarowitz v. A. & M. Kramer, 275 App. Div. 875, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 885,
affd. 300 N. Y. 637, 90 N. E. 2d 494 (1949).
31 Supra n. 30.
32 Supra n. 30.
33 Supra n. 30.
34 Supa n. 30.
Jan., 1963
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The Maricle Case was decided in 1954.35 If the courts had
adhered to the precedent established in this case, any evidence
of mental derangement would have been sufficient to allow re-
covery. Yet in 1957, the Court of Appeals in New York refused
to allow a death claim when the decedent's mental condition was
similar to the condition described in the 1954 decision.36
The conflict in these decisions appears to be reconcilable.
Uniformly the courts hold that the degree of insanity required
to allow recovery is a question of proof to be determined by the
trier of the facts. 37 When there is evidence of a mental derange-
ment, the reviewing court will not reconsider or revaluate the
initial determination; however, an award will be overruled when
the claimant fails to produce any evidence of mental derange-
ment.
38
Thus, when the New York position is analyzed the disparity
in the illustrated cases is resolved. In both cases evidence of
some mental derangement was introduced. The Commission con-
sidered the evidence, allowing the claim in the Maricle Case39 and
denying it in the Vernum Case.40 Since the reviewing courts
refrain from revaluating the evidence on mental derangement,
the initial determination made by the Industrial Commission is
upheld if there is some evidence to support its finding. Therefore,
since both cases had evidence regarding mental disorder, the
reviewing courts were correct in upholding the Commission's
decision without questioning the findings of the administrative
board.
In New York, death claims are awarded if a compensable
accident causes a mental derangement which produces the act
of self-destruction. The degree of brain derangement or insanity
is not definite and must be decided by the commission in each
case. This determination is not altered by the reviewing tribunal
if there is some evidence, no matter how slight, to support the
35 Ibid.
36 Estate of Vernum, supra n. 30.
37 Blau v. Goldshare Restaurant, 278 App. Div. 595, 102 N. Y. S. 2d 84(1951); Com. of Taxation & Finance v. Hedstrom-Spaulding Inc. supra
n. 30; Lockwood v. Luckey Platt & Co., supra n. 30. All of these cases
approved death benefits awarded by the Industrial Commission.
38 The following cases reversed the Workmen's Compensation Commission
as there was absolutely no evidence of mental derangement: Palmer v. Red-
man, supra n. 10; Seal v. Effron Fuel Oil Co., supra n. 30; Wessells v.
Lockport Cotton Batting Co., 275 App. Div. 733, 87 N. Y. S. 2d 186 (1949).
39 Supra n. 30.
40 Supra n. 30.
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original finding. It would appear that New York lacks a definite
standard to determine whether or not the mental disorder is
sufficient to allow recovery. If the commission holds the de-
rangement adequate, then the suicide is compensable. The
volitional condition of the deceased's mind is not a determining
factor.
According to New York's position, the standard of de-
rangement is determined in each case. If the Industrial Com-
mission decides that the derangement is sufficient, an award will
be made. This decision is not altered by a reviewing court; and
therefore, this is the standard New York has adopted. If it is
acceptable to the Industrial Commission, then the derangement
is sufficient to allow recovery.
The extreme minority view rejects the concept of degrees,
and holds that any insanity or mental derangement is sufficient
to allow recovery. This view has been adopted from the British
rule regarding suicide and workmen's compensation. In England,
death caused by intentional self-destruction is compensable if
due to a mental derangement which was the result of a com-
pensable accident.41 The view totally disregards the theory that
the decedent must be incapable of a volitional act at the time of
his death.
The most recent case accepting this minority view was de-
cided in January, 1962.42 The Supreme Court of Illinois, in
Harper v. Industrial Com.,43 upheld the decision of the Circuit
Court, and allowed a death claim for volitional suicide. The
Circuit Court reversed the initial determination of the Industrial
Commission which had disallowed the death claim. The lower
court's reversal was upheld by the Supreme Court. In this case
of first impression, the Court was highly critical of the majority
rule. The primary basis for this criticism is that the majority
rule fails to recognize the role which pain and despair play in
affecting the mind of the injured person. The court rejected the
requirement of volition and asserted that any mental derange-
ment can be sufficient to allow recovery; no guide line as to the
extent or degree of derangement was considered by the court.
It is of utmost importance to note that Illinois is one of the few
states without a provision regarding self-inflicted injury in their
41 Fanning v. Richard Evans & Co., 16 B. W. C. C. 43 (1923); 1 Larson,
Workmen's Compensation, sec. 36.10, p. 504, (1952); Anno. 143 A. L. R. 1232
(1943).
42 Harper v. Industrial Com., supra n. 3. For discussion see 31 U. Cinc.
L. R. 187 (1962).
43 Ibid.
Jan., 1963
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Workmen's Compensation statutes.44 In fact, Justice Shaefer ex-
pressly states that a decision of this nature might not be appli-
cable in a state controlled by a statute which expressly prohibits
the payment of compensation for self-inflicted injuries.4 5
This Illinois decision cites with approval the two most
prominent cases following the minority view.46 The court referred
to Whitehead v. Keene Roofing Co.,47 in which the Florida
Supreme Court rejected the majority rule and allowed a death
claim. Although the majority rule was rejected, the factual
situation would present a compensable death claim if the modern
majority rule had been applied. The California Court of Ap-
peals 48 allowed a death claim, and its opinion comprehensively
treats the minority view.
The Whitehead49 case, decided in 1949, was one of the first
cases in the United States which explicitly rejected the majority
rule. However, a careful analysis of the factual situation clearly
indicates that the injury and the condition of the decedent's mind
would satisfy the requirement set forth in the modern majority
rule. The deceased suffered a serious compensable injury. While
experiencing excruciating pain and partial paralysis the injured
party swallowed poison which caused his death. Before expiring,
the deceased said that the reason for his suicidal act was that he
had "gone nuts." This was sufficient evidence to establish that
the decedent's mental condition was non-volitional. The review-
ing courts of Florida have not considered a suicide case which
would be beyond the limits established in the modern majority
rule. Therefore, it would be interesting to see the outcome of a
case in Florida which clearly failed to qualify under the majority
rule.50
Burnight v. Industrial Co."1 was the second case cited by the
Illinois court, and it unquestionably adopts the minority view.
In fact, it is the best proponent of it. The minority position is
stated thus:
44 Supra n. 13.
45 Harper v. Industrial Com., supra n. 3 at 482.
46 Id. at 483.
47 Whitehead v. Keene Roofing Co., supra n. 3; see 3 U. Fla. L. R. 263
(1950).
48 Burnight v. Industrial Accident Com., supra n. 3; see 8 U. C. L. A. L. R.
673 (1961).
49 Supra n. 3.
50 Since the Whitehead v. Keene case, (supra n. 3), neither the Florida
Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court seem to have considered a death
claim under Workmen's Compensation due to suicide.
51 Burnight v. Industrial Accident Com., supra n. 3.
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Where the injuries suffered by the deceased result in his
becoming devoid of normal judgment, and dominated by a
disturbance of mind directly caused by his injury and its
consequences, his suicide can not be considered willful with-
in the meaning and intent of the act.5 2
This case considered a death claim for a suicide produced by
overwork. In reversing the Industrial Commission's decision, the
court held that neither a traumatic injury nor a non-volitional
act is required in order to allow a death claim due to suicide.
The court reasoned that since the decedent's employment pre-
cipated a mental condition which ultimately led to suicide, it
should be compensable. In adopting this position it was the
California court's opinion that this view was accepted in England,
Florida, Mississippi, New York, Massachusetts, and Iowa.53
However, a careful analysis of authorities cited in the
Burnight case would indicate that in actuality the modern ma-
jority view has been used in some of these jurisdictions. England
is committed to the minority view which she initially formulated.
In order to approve a death claim the intentional self-destruction
must be the result of an insane condition which in turn was due
to a compensable injury. There is no requirement as to the
degree of insanity. In England, the deceased can be aware of the
consequences of his act and still recover.54
It is submitted that the Mississippi decision5 5 illustrates the
modern majority rule rather than the minority view as contended
by the California court. In that case the Industrial Commission's
award of death benefits was affirmed. The suicide occurred after
the decedent suffered a compensable injury which aggravated
a pre-existing condition. Expert witnesses testified that the
deceased was in constant pain, and was suffering from a manic-
depressive mental disorder. The witnesses were of the opinion
that the deceased, due to his mental condition, was unable to
comprehend the consequences of the fatal act.
The legislative enactment of Massachusetts" does not
specifically codify the minority view; however, it is a liberaliza-
tion of the strict majority rule as initially formulated in Massa-
52 Id. at 791.
53 Id. at 792.
54 Supra n. 41.
55 Prentiss Truck & Tractor Co. v. Spencer, 228 Miss. 66, 87 S. 2d 272 (1952).
56 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., Ch. 152, sec. 26A (1937).
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chusetts. Under this statute a dependent of the decedent must
establish that the compensable injury caused the insanity, and
that the insanity rendered the deceased not responsible for his
act of self-destruction. Reviewing courts of this state have not
construed the statute; therefore, whether or not a specific degree
of insanity is required is yet to be litigated.
The Iowa case of Schofield v. White,57 another cited authority
of the Burnight case, is an excellent illustration of a suicide which
would be universally compensable. While in the course of his
employment, the deceased fell and sustained a serious head
injury. This precipitated immediate, continuing insanity. The
decedent never regained his rationality, and while in this con-
dition committed suicide. This factual situation would be com-
pensable under either the majority or minority view.
The Nohe v. Sheffield Farms Co.58 case was relied upon as
support for the minority view; however, it fails to accomplish
this purpose. While it does not support the minority position, it
is an excellent illustration of the present status of the New York
law.
The distinguishing characteristics and aspects of Whitehead
v. Keene Roofing Co.5 9 have been discussed. While this case is
authority for the minority position, the factual situation could
have allowed recovery under the modern majority rule.
Thus, after a careful analysis of the authorities cited in the
Burnight Case ° it could appear that some fail to support the
view proposed in the decision.
California, Connecticut, and Illinois have unquestionably
accepted the minority view.61 In these jurisdictions a decedent's
act of self-destruction need not be non-volitional. The require-
ments for an award, under this view, are that when the act of
self-destruction is committed, the mind of the deceased must be
subject to a mental disorder. There must be some connection
between the disorder and the compensable accident. The non-
volitional aspect of the decedent's mind is not considered.
Two of the three states, Connecticut and Illinois, following
the minority view are not restrained by a provision common to
57 Supra n. 9.
58 Nohe v. Sheffield Farms Co., 4 App. Div. 2d 711, 163 N. Y. S. 2d 455
(1957).
59 Whitehead v. Keene Roofing Co., supra n. 3.
60 Burnight v. Industrial Accident Com., supra n. 3.
61 Burnight v. Industrial Accident Com., supra n. 3; Harper v. Industrial
Com., supra n. 3; Wilder v. Russell, supra n. 4.
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most workmen's compensation laws which precludes recovery
for self-inflicted injury.6 2
The Illinois Supreme Court,6 3 in adopting the minority view,
stated that they were free to do so because the legislature had
not included a provision of this nature in the Illinois Workmen's
Compensation Act.
California is the only state which has specifically accepted
the minority view despite a legislative enactment precluding
recovery for self-inflicted injuries. 64 This difficulty was overcome
by a judicial interpretation of the statute. The court held that
this provision denied compensation for self-inflicted injuries only
when the injuries were sustained with the intent to obtain the
benefits.
It would appear that the proponents of the minority view
would prefer to determine whether a suicide is compensable by
applying a loose, indefinable standard. If a compensable injury
caused a mental condition leading to suicide, then a death claim
should be awarded, even though the deceased knew, in a con-
fused fashion, that he was ending his life. Whether or not the
deceased knew the physical consequences of his act is immaterial
when applying this standard. Neither the lack of knowledge nor
the irresistible impulse requirement is necessary under this view.
Simply stated, the minority view allows recovery even if the
decedent knows what he is doing at the time of the fatal act.
Conclusion
When death is due to self-destruction there are two views
as to when death claims should be allowed. Both views require
a mental derangement; however, the degree and extent required
creates the conflict.
The minority view is subdivided into two positions. First,
New York has formulated a moderate point of view requiring
some degree of insanity. Second, there are a few jurisdictions
which have accepted the English position which does not require
the decedent to be insane at the time the suicidal act is com-
mitted. The latter view is most extreme.
Barber v. Industrial Com.65 is the best illustration of the
62 Supra n. 13.
63 Harper v. Industrial Com., supra n. 3.
64 Burnight v. Industrial Accident Corn., supra n. 3; see note 8, U. C. L. A.
L. R. 673 (1961).
65 Barber v. Industrial Corn., supra n. 22; Anno. 12 N. C. C. A. (N. S.)
298 (1943).
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differences between the minority and the majority position. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court denied the death claim, adhering to
the majority rule. The court held that the decedent had rational
knowledge of the consequences of his act; and therefore, due to
this conscious volition, the suicide was not compensable. The
dissenting opinion of Judge Fowler was highly critical of the
court and proposed the adoption of the minority view. He re-
jected the principle of non-volition and stated that as long as the
decedent was devoid of normal judgment, recovery should be
allowed. This case brings into focus the conflicts between the
majority and minority positions.
In rejecting the rule accepted in most jurisdictions, the
minority view neglects to recognize the historical development
of the modern majority rule. When the rule was first enunciated
in the early 1900's, little was known of the functions and re-
actions of the human mind. Therefore, the court required an
outward manifestation of the decedent's mental condition. The
condition of the mind was determined by the acts of the de-
ceased. Thus, when the acts reflected an uncontrollable im-
pulse or a delirium of frenzy, the person was considered to be
incapable of a rational act. As soon as a person was relieved of
responsibility for his acts recovery was allowed.
It is submitted that under the minority view recovery is
possible when the suicidal act is purely volitional. No standard
has been established to determine the condition of the decedent's
mind at the time of death; therefore, it is possible to award a
death claim for a purely volitional suicide. An award under
these circumstances would frustrate the intent and purpose of
the workmen's compensation statute and it could be considered
against public policy.
It seems that the better view rigidly adheres to the principle
that the act of self-destruction must be non-volitional. The
volitional condition of the deceased's mind is an issue of fact to
be proven by competent evidence. The following tests could be
applied to determine whether or not death benefits should be
awarded: (1) Was the decedent's act of self-destruction non-
volitional? (2) If there was a lack of volition, was this mental
condition directly caused by a compensable injury? If an
affirmative answer can be given to both of these questions, the
claim should be allowed.
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